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KENTUOcY LAW JoxNALV
DEFENDING DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT SUITS IN
KENTUCKY: ARTICLE NINE, PART 5 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
This comment will attempt to develop the defenses available to
lawyers representing consumer-debtors in deficiency judgment suits
in Kentucky.1 Primary emphasis will be placed on the statutory
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the Code]
with relevant case and statutory law discussed in connection with the
defenses arising under Article Nine of the Code. Since most of the
available defenses arise from creditor misbehavior in the course of
repossession or resale of the collateral,2 consideration will be given
to the types of creditor conduct which give rise to debtor defenses.
A special effort will be made to evaluate the authority of pre-Code
Kentucky law. In areas where the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
not ruled on relevant Code provisions, attention will be given to the
law developed in other jurisdictions. In passing, the discussion will
be directed to debtor crossclaims and remedies found both within
the Code and beyond.
IEPOSSESSION
Assuming the debtor is in default, Section 9-503 authorizes the
secured creditor to take possession of the collateral "unless otherwise
agreed" and "without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace .... ." Otherwise, the creditor "may proceed by
[judicial] action."3 Examination of the security agreement will in-
1 This comment focuses on defenses to creditor foreclosure of conditional sales
contracts with defaulting consumers. Article Nine of the Kentucky revision of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC or CODE], Ky. REv. STAT.
ch. 355 [hereinafter cited as KRS], covers conditional sale transactions; see UCC §
9-102(2). For analytical purposes, this comment assumes that the collateral in
question is consumer goods as defined in UCC § 9-109(1). However, the principles
developed in this comment are not limited to consumer transactions and will apply
to other types of collateral.
2 See generally R. SPEmEL, R. SUmmERs & J. WHITE, TACNG MATERIALS ON
Coxnmcr. TRANSACTIONS 385-412 (1969); White, Representing the Low-
Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resale, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3
UCC L.J. 199 (1971).
3 UCC § 9-503 reads as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of
the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so pro-
vides the scuredparty may require the debtor to assemble the collateral
and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated
by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Without removal a securedparty may render equipment unusable, and
may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under KRS § 355.9-504.
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dicate whether "self-help"4 by the creditor is excluded, and whether
subsequent repossession of the collateral by the creditor was in
violation of the contract. If no contractual limitation upon creditor
repossession exists, inquiry into the mode of repossession may reveal
that the creditor pursued the "self-help" course and thus created a
possible breach of the peace defense to repossession.
In the repossession context, breach of the peace has been the
subject of only a few Kentucky Court of Appeals decisions. While
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 487 [hereinafter KRS] provides
statutory definitions of the offenses against public peace, "[tihe term
'breach of the peace' is generic, and includes all violations of public
peace or order or acts tending to the disturbance thereof."5 The use
of this generic phrase and the failure of the Code to define it indicates
that pre-Code decisions are still good law and will be authority
under the Code.( An early case, Hawkins Furniture Co. v. Morris,
7
stated the general rule for repossession as follows:
If in taking possession of property over the objection of the mort-
gagor, he [the creditor] would be required to use such force as
would amount to a breach of the peace, or an assault, or subject
him to an action for trespass, he must resort to the courts for
redress and cannot forcibly or violently take possession of the
mortgaged property. 8
Since the Court has stated that breach of the peace is not limited
to the specific fact situations which have been the subject of its
decisions, 9 it is facilitative for analytical purposes to postulate two
basic situations in which the breach of the peace defense may arise
and to discern from Court opinions the general contour of Kentucky
law.'0
4 "Self-help" as used in this comment refers to creditor repossession under-
taken without any judicial process as compared to repossession made pursuant
to replevin and claim and delivery statutes.
5 0 'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Ky. 1969) citing King
v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W. 419 (Ky. 1907).
6 It should be noted that many pre-CoDE cases were decided under statutory
laws allowing sellers to repossess peaceably if it was possible to do so. See LEGIS-
LATIVE =EEARiCH COMMISSION, UNIFORM COMMEanRCIAL CODE, ANALYSIS oF EFFEcT
oN EXISTING KENTUCKY LAW, REsm~cH PuB. No. 49, at 888 (1957) [hereinafter
LRC No. 49].
7 137 S.W. 527 (Ky. 1911).
SId. at 528. Accord, Farmer's & Depositor's Bank v. Taylor, 162 S.W.2d 764
(Ky. 1942); Cartwright v. C.LT. Corp., 70 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1934); A. C. Morris
Co. v. Heaton, 29 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1930).
90 'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Ky. 1969).
10 A format suggested by White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in
Repossessions, Resale and Deficiency judgment Cases, 3 UCC LJ. 199 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as White].
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The first type of situation involves repossession that is made in
spite of protests by the debtor. In National Bond & Investment Co.
v. Whitehorn l the Court held unlawful the repossession of a debtor's
automobile by the creditor's agents who stopped the debtor on a
public street and took his care in spite of protests that led to the
debtor's subsequent arrest for breach of the peace. This case suggests
that oral protests can be sufficient if some threat of violence also exists.
In C. F. Adams Co. v. Sanders,'2 the Court held that creditor re-
possession of a clock from the debtor's home was not unlawful in
spite of the debtor's wife's "agitation." Inferentially, the Court could
not find a threat of violence. In Fort Knox National Bank v. Gus-
tafson,13 a debtor's wife "vigorously protested repossession" (emphasis
added), and the Court in dictum stated that "repossession could not
be had peaceably." 4
When asserting breach of the peace defenses, lawyers should
examine creditor behavior to find conduct inviting violence or public
disorder. If a debtor has objected to repossession in unequivocal
terms, the circumstances of the repossession will, in most instances,
warrant a valid defense. Although not articulated by the Court of
Appeals,15 the underlying policy of the breach of the peace doctrine
is to prevent violence, and public interests are protected by the rule
as well as debtors' rights. Thus, even if confronted with a sales
contract purporting to authorize forceful repossession, a debtor's
counsel can argue that contract expectations are subordinated to
public interests. Without further elaboration, it can be stated that
any actual assault or forceful coercion calculated to overcome debtor
protests will constitute breach of the peace in Kentucky.16
The second basic fact situation in which breach of the peace
defenses may arise concerns repossession from a debtor's premises.
In this situation, the Court has allowed repossession when sales
contracts have authorized it.'7 The only limitation seems to be
11 128 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1938).
12 66 S.W. 815 (Ky. 1902).
13 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1964).
14 Fort Knox Natl Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Ky. 1964).
15 At least since the adoption of the UCC, the Court of Appeals has not
elaborated on the policy behind the breach of the peace doctrine. For policy
statements, see Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc.2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114,
119-20 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Girard v. Anderson, 257 N.W. 400 (Iowa 1934).
16 See text at note 8 supra. See Nat'l Bond & Inv. Co. v. Whitehorn, 123
S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1939).
17 Cf. G.M.A.C. v. Holbrook, 375 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1964); G.M.A.C.v. Cr,
338 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1960); C.I.T. Corp. v. Short, 115 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1938),
Cartwright v. C.I.T. Corp., 70 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1934); C.M.A.C. v. Dickinson,
60 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1933).
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that repossession cannot involve forcible entry. However, when
repossession is not authorized in the contract, it is clear that creditors
are not at liberty to commit trespass to recover their collateral.
Typically, these cases come before the Court of Appeals in actions
for tort recovery and not in suits for deficiency judgments.18 Never-
theless, the general principle can be discerned that recovery of col-
lateral from debtors' premises is permissible only when contractually
authorized; otherwise, a trespass would result and the repossession
would be unlawful under the principle announced in Hawkins.19
Aside from the basic situations in which repossession is objected
to by debtors, or when the collateral is repossessed from the debtor's
premises, breach of the peace can be established when creditors act
in any manner tending to disturb the public tranquility. Debtors'
lawyers are advised to scrutinize the manner of repossession to find
behavior which courts will find objectionable. For example, breach
of the peace was found in Driver v. Commonwealth" where a
creditor's agent broke a window of a secured car parked on a public
street in order to repossess it. When raising defenses based on breach
of the peace, lawyers are strongly urged to emphasize that any
creditor misconduct is unnecessary in view of the judicial recourse
available to creditors, and that Section 9-507(1) is specifically de-
signed to penalize heavy-handed credit behavior.21
While the analysis to this point has been predicated on the con-
tinuing validity of Section 9-503, the self-help provision now stands on
questionable constitutional footing, and a recent Supreme Court
decision can be utilized by debtors' lawyers to invalidate any summary
repossession. In Fuentes v. Shevin,2 the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional on procedural due process grounds Florida and Penn-
sylvania replevin statutes that authorized state agents to seize goods
pursuant to ex parte applications by creditors. Under the statutes,
creditors could have goods repossessed without giving any prior notice
to debtors and without affording debtors any prior hearing. The Court,
in deciding Fuentes, expanded upon a principle announced in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.23 that summary procedures whereby
debtors' wages could be garnished without a prior hearing violated
the fourteenth amendments due process clause. The Sniadach Court
18 See, e.g., Home Finance Co. v. Ratliff, 874 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1964);
G.M.A.C. v. Shuey, 47 S.W.2d 968 (Ky. 1932).
19 See text at note 8 supra.
20 299 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1957).
21 See text at note 59 infra.
22407 U.S. 67 (1972).
23395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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reasoned that wage garnishments imposed tremendous hardships on
wage earners and that such results could not be permitted without
the garnishee having an opportunity to defend.
The impact of the Sniadach decision on the continuing validity of
Code Section 9-503 was not fully realized, however, until Fuentes.
Lower courts were able to distinguish Sniadach from ordinary replevin
procedures on the ground that Sniadach involved a particularly ob-
jectionable hardship to garnishees. In fact, the lower courts in Fuentes
v. Faircloth24 reached their decisions in favor of the Florida statute
by making this distinction. The Supreme Court, in overruling the
lower courts' decisions, explained that a person has a right to a fair
hearing at a meaningful time whenever significant property rights are
threatened. The Court explicitly pointed out that the property need
not be a necessity of life because the "Fourteenth Amendment speaks
of 'property' generally."25
The utility of Fuentes for challenging self-help repossession in
Kentucky is subject to a number of as yet unanswered questions.
Since the Fuentes Court invalidated state statutes authorizing state
agents to repossess goods, creditors' self-help conceivably is not state
action which brings it under fourteenth amendment limitations. How-
ever, since creditor repossession is authorized under Section 9-503,
state sanction of the procedure is necessarily state action. More
difficult problems arise if sales contracts authorize creditor re-
possession. Again, a state action problem is involved because contracts
present a separate authorization for repossession apart from Section
9-503. While arguing that state law gives legitimacy to such con-
tractual provisions has considerable support in Supreme Court
decisions, 26 an obstacle exists under Kentucky case law.
In C.LT. Corp. v. Thompson27 a trial court had cancelled the
effect of a conditional sales contract on the ground that it violated the
debtor's constitutional rights.28 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating
that the "purchaser had agreed for the lien to be enforced in the
manner set forth in the contract."29 Without elaborating, the Court
24 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
25 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).26See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemar, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
But see Kirksey v. Thelig, 41 U.S.L.W. 2325 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 1972) holding
that self-help repossession pursuant to 9-503 is not action under color of state
law.
27 169 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1943).
28 The Court of Appeals did not elaborate on the constitutional decisions
reached by the lower court.2 9 C.I.T. Corp. v. Thompson, 169 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Ky. 1943).
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appeared to base its opinion on a waiver of constitutional rights
theory. Fuentes may be of considerable help in overcoming the
waiver theory because the Supreme Court was also dealing with a
sales contract that authorized creditor repossession without judicial
process. The Supreme Court rejected a waiver defense by pointing
out that the sales contract provided for repossession without any
mention of how or through what process the seller could reclaim the
goods; thus an agreed statement of the seller's rights could not
constitute a waiver of the buyer's due process rights because "a
waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very
least, be clear."30
In the event that a court can be persuaded that summary re-
possession violated a debtor's constitutional rights, the question of
what consequences such a violation will have on a deficiency judg-
ment is difficult to ascertain. While the discussion of Code Section
9-507, which concerns debtors' remedies is postponed,. 1 it should be
pointed out that Section 9-507 provides remedies for creditor viola-
tions of Article Nine provisions. Obviously, the Fuentes case inter-
jects non-Code limitations on creditor conduct. An enterprising
attorney might argue that the Fuentes prior notice limitation is now
incorporated into Section 9-503 restrictions, but considerable doubt
must exist as to the likelihood of succeeding on Section 9-507 remedies.
One final fact should be noted before considering resale of the col-
lateral. Kentucky's claim and delivery statutes, KRS § 425.120
through § 425.180, are analogous to the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes struck down in Fuentes since they also authorize summary
repossession. Thus, if the creditor elects not to pursue self-help re-
possession and instead chooses these judicial procedures for repos-
session, a debtor's lawyer should not hesitate to rely on Fuentes.3 2
RESALE
If the repossession is lawful or the defenses to repossession fail, a
debtor's lawyer should focus his attention on the Code requirements
for resale of the collateral. Code Section 9-504(3) requires that the
creditor must send "reasonable notification" to the debtor, and that
the sale must be "commercially reasonable."33 In raising defenses
30 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972).
31 See text at note 59 infra.32 It is anomalous that Fuentes stands as better authority for defeating re-
possession under heretofore acceptable claim and delivery statutes than for self-
help repossession by creditors. It would seem that creditor self-help violates a
debtor's due process rights to a greater degree than state replevin procedures.
33 UCC §9-504(3) provides as follows:
(Continued on next page)
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based on inadequate notice, pre-Code cases are not reliable authority.
The Code does not specify advertising requirements nor does it
specify the number of days prior to sale for giving notice.34 Thus,
cases decided under prior statutory law may not determine what is
"reasonable notification."
In Kentucky, the leading case defining the Section 9-504(3) notice
requirement is Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan of Henderson,
Inc.35 The Court of Appeals construed Section 9-504(3) to mean that
"the debtor is entitled to notification of a specific date after which the
creditor may proceed to dispose of the collateral."36  The Court
reasoned that such notice would give the debtor a deadline within
which to protect himself. The mere fact that the debtor knew that
the collateral would be sold eventually was not sufficient notice.
37
The specific time requirement applies both to public and private
sales; however, the Code also states that with public sales, notice of
the place of the sale must be sent.38 Thus, if a creditor uses a public
sale to dispose of the collateral but has failed to notify the debtor
of the place of the sale, he has violated Section 9-504(3), and the
debtor's insufficient notice defense will be good.
The sending requirement of Section 9-504(3) indicates that the
notice must be in writing. "Send" is a defined term in the Code,39
and if the transmission is by mail, the Code clearly indicates that
failure to correctly address a letter will not be sufficient 40 Lawyers
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings
and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disosi-
tion may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on
any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method,
manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless
collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification
of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the
time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to
be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except
in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement
indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who is known by the
secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The secured
party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the sub-
ject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at
private sale.
84 See White, supra note 10, at 209-12. Cf. KRS § 426.160.
35 452 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1970).
36 Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, 452 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Ky. 1970).
37 Id. at 877-78.
38 See note 88 supra.
39 See UCC § 1-801(38).
40 Id.
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should be aware, however, that even after the letter is improperly
addressed, receipt of the notice within the time at which it would
have arrived if properly sent is sufficient.
41
No cases define how much time is to be allowed between the
date of notice and the date of resale. Comment 5 to Section 9-504(3)
in the official text states that notice must be sent with sufficient time
for the debtor "to take appropriate steps to protect [his] interests."
42
While KRS § 426.160 does not control,43 it can be argued that the
ten days' notice time for resale pursuant to executed judgment liens is
a good indication of legislative intent regarding what is a reasonable
time. Lawyers should emphasize that debtors need time to look for
money or credit to protect their interests, and that at least a week
or ten days is reasonable time to arrange for other financing.
While the mode of repossession and notice are certainly relevant
to defending deficiency suits, the actual sale of the collateral is
generally the crux of the dispute. Obviously, if the resale price is
low, the debtor's deficiency will be high; thus, the requirements of
Section 9-504(3) that the "method, manner, time, place, and terms
[of the resale] must be commercially reasonable" are protections
against insufficient price. As one commentator points out, "[i]f the
sale price is sufficient, the debtor has received no injury even if the
sale was held at midnight on the steps of the Kremlin."44 This idea
was given at least implicit recognition by the Court of Appeals in
BSY Co. v. Fuel Economy Engineering Co.4 5 There, a subcontractor
had quit its job after the prime contractor had advanced the sub-
contractor considerable sums of money. In addition, the subcontractor
was delinquent in its payments to a third party vendor for the price
of a cement machine. The prime contractor bought the third party's
lien on the machine and, after repossession, "bought" the machine by
giving the subcontractor credit on its prior advancement debt for the
entire purchase price of the machine. No notice of this "sale" was
given to the subcontractor nor were any other buyers considered.
41 Id.4 2 Tnz AmiUcAN LAw INsTrruTE NATIONAL CONFE.ENcE OF CommnssioNEns
ON UN FoRm STATE LAWS, UNwol. COMMERcI CODE 723 (1972). It should be
noted that the Comments are authority for explaining the general policy behind
CODE sections.43 See Comment to KRS § 355.9-504. According to Professor Frederick W.
Whiteside, of the College of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
KRS § 426.160 applies to sales of personal property pursuant to execution and
levy on judgment liens. By implication, it does not apply to foreclosure of
conditional sales contracts which are covered by the CODE.44 White, supra note 10, at 212.
45 399 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1965).
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The Court held that the resale by the prime contractor was com-
mercially reasonable.
A 1933 case, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dickinson,46 is
still cited in post-Code cases, primarily because the statutory pro-
visions that were applicable are substantially similar to Code Section
9-504(3).47 In Dickinson, the Court of Appeals held that the seller
who has repossessed must exercise ordinary diligence in obtaining
the "best price" on resale, but that determining ordinary care in
reselling an automobile does not require "due regard for the fair
and reasonable market value of the car."48 This holding is consistent
with the dictum in the recent case of Fort Knox National Bank v.
Gustafson,49 where the Court of Appeals, in citing Section 9-507(1),
stated that:
[Tihe mere fact that a better price could have been obtained by
sale at a different time, or different place or manner is not of
itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not commercially
reasonable. 0
Notwithstanding the fact that a low price will not, by itself, establish
a good defense, the implication is that a low price is the prime indica-
tion that the creditor may have failed to properly conduct the sale.
Therefore, lawyers might contend that if the price is low the creditor
must go forward with showing that the sale was commercially reason-
able. A Tennessee case, Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan
Corp.,51 can be cited for its holding that "[s]ince the proof incident
to advertisement and sale was peculiarly within the knowledge of
Volunteer Finance, the burden was upon it to show compliance with
[9-504(3)]. "52 Because in Kentucky it is incumbent upon a creditor
to obtain the "best price," it can also be argued that the general status
of a market is more likely to be within the knowledge of the creditor
than the debtor, and thus the seller should carry the burden of
showing why a low price was obtained.53
Although the Court of Appeals held in Nelson v. Monarch Invest-
ment Plan of Henderson, Inc.5 4 that the sale of a $1,400 repossessed
automobile for $750 to the highest bidder of three used-car dealers
46 60 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1933).
47 LRC No, 49, supra note 6, at 389.
48 G.M.A.C. v. Dickinson, 60 S.W.2d 967, 969 (Ky. 1933).
49 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1964).
5o Id. at 201-02.
51415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. 1966).
5 2 Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tenn.
1966).
53 See White, supra note 10, at 216.
54 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970).
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was commercially reasonable, it did so because "there was nothing
to indicate lack of good faith, unfairness or fraud."55 This holding
seems to signify that the creditor must make a good faith effort to
obtain a reasonable price.56 In that connection, a recommended trial
tactic is asking the seller what he would have done if he had sold
the collateral for himself. If the collateral was disposed of by public
sale, an examination should be made into how the sale was advertised
and what effort was made to solicit a large number of bidders.
Likewise, if a private sale was involved, lawyers should inquire
whether the seller took the first offer tendered or whether a good
faith effort was made to contact all or most potential buyers.
Although it may be sufficient if the creditor shows an apparently
reasonable attempt to sell, debtor's counsel can argue that the
creditor should submit some evidence beyond the mere circumstances
of the sale to prove that the sale price was at or near the relevant
market price for such collateral. 57 If the price is low, lawyers should
be able to find something in the creditor's "method, manner, time, or
place" to indicate a commercially unreasonable sale.58
RlE mmDs
While creditor misbehavior in repossessing or reselling the col-
lateral may subject him to criminal penalties or tort liabilities under
non-Code law, 9 Section 9-507(1) is immediately available in defining
55 Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, 452 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Ky. 1970).
55 It should be noted that the general "good faith provision of UCC § 1-203
cuts across all of the CODE.
57 See White, supra note 10, at 216. As a "bibliographical suggestion," the
introduction to KRS Chapter 355 in the Banks-Baldwin edition recommends ob-
taining a copy of the drafters' comments to learn the "purpose and effect" of each
CODE provision. By following that suggestion, practitioners representing debtors can
construct a favorable position regarding the seller's resale duties that cannot be
found in the sparse case law or in the vacuous language of the CODE itself.
Comment 1 to § 9-504 states that "this section follows the provisions on the
section on resale by a seller following a buyer's rejection of the goods," which is
§ 2-706. Section 2-706 uses the same language of § 2-504(3) that "every aspect
of the sale, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms be commercially
reasonable." In adding gloss to § 2-706, Comment 2 states:
The seller must act "in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner" in making the resale. This standard is intended to be more
comprehensive than that of "reasonable care and judgment" established
by prior uniform statutory provisions.
Comment 4 states:
[§ 2-706] frees the remedy of resale from legalistic restrictions and en-
ables the seller to resell in accordance with reasonable commercial
practices so as to realize as high a price as possible in the circumstances
(emphasis added).
58 It is submitted that if a court or jury is sufficiently impressed that a resale
price is too low, a lawyer only needs to provide a "peg" on which "to hang" a
favorable decision.
59 See White, supra note 10, at 216-17.
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his Code liability. The damage provision of Section 9-507(1) gives
the debtor a cause of action against the creditor for "any loss caused
by failure to comply with the provisions of this Part." Because of the
difficulty of proving actual loss and because the economic loss to
the consumer may be small, Section 9-507(1) also provides that:
If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover
in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus
ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price
differential plus ten percent of the cash price.
Thus, the consumer is entitled to a minimum recovery even if he has
suffered no loss.
Equitable remedies are also available.60 If the resale of the col-
lateral can be shown to have been fraudulent or collusive, KIRS §
426.820 provides that the sale may be set aside. While the exact
effect of Fuentes is yet to be determined, lawyers can contend that
summary repossession is no longer allowable and that return of the
collateral to the consumer is proper. If resale has occurred following
repossession, it should be argued that the sale should be vacated
and the collateral returned to the debtor. Finally, the Court of
Appeals has not recognized the doctrine that creditor noncompliance
with Part 5 of Article Nine may result in a creditor's forfeiture of
his right to a deficiency judgment. Nevertheless, several courts have
adopted the position that creditor noncompliance bars recovery of
a deficiency.61 Considering the equitable merit of the doctrine,
perhaps the time is ripe for its acceptance in Kentucky.62
James A. Harris, Jr.
60 UCC § 1-103 authorizes non-CoDE remedies.
61 Cf. Skeels v. C.I.T. Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Norton
v. Natl Bank of Commerce, 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. 1966); Braswell v. American
Nat'l Bank, 161 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. 1968); Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 156 S.E. 2d
310 (Ga. 1967); Franz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 181 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1962).
62 With respect to the analysis in note 57 supra, the argument can be made
that a creditor is barred from a deficiency judgment if he fails to comply with his
resale duties as a result of the CoDE drafters' intent, embodied in Comment 2 of
§ 2-706, that "failure to act properly under this section deprives the seller of
the measure of his damages here provided.... ".The Court of Appeals has
not decided this issue.
With regard to "finding law" in the Comments, it should be noted that the
Court of Appeals has not been reluctant to use the Official Comments to bridge
considerable gaps in the COD. For an excellent case showing the Court's adroit-
ness in applying the Comments to reach results not specifically provided for in
the CODE text, see Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387
S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1965).
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